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Abstract 
 
The linkage between corporate commitment to environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
issues and investment performance has generated a substantial body of research outside the real 
estate sector. Nevertheless, the relationship between the environmental performance and 
financial performance of companies is still not well understood as studies have found mixed and 
contradicting results. Drawing upon the KLD database which contains ratings on seven ESG 
dimensions from 2003-2009, this paper investigates the relationship between the ESG rating and 
the financial performance of a sample of US real estate firms. Since the primary transmission 
channel from ESG activities to financial performance may be better reflected by a firm's 
intangible assets, we model both Tobin's q and the total annual return in a panel framework with 
time and sector specific fixed effects.  Our results are largely consistent with the existing 
literature finding a positive relationship between CFP and CSP.  Further, the time scale of the 
lagged effects seems plausible.     
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Introduction 
 
Primarily driven by climate change and mirroring a paradigm shift in public concern, 
environmentally responsible and sustainable business practices have become more prominent for 
corporations‟ strategic and operational activities.  For investors, the scope of responsible 
investment can cover not only environmental issues and climate change mitigation but also the 
effects of businesses on a broad range of social and ethical concerns. The paper investigates the 
implications of this strategic shift in the allocation of resources towards such ethical concerns for 
the performance of commercial real estate companies. Specifically, it aims to assess whether 
there is a link between the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) ratings of large real estate 
companies and their financial performance. 
 
We have organized the paper as follows. The next section situates our research question within 
the existing literature. In the third section, we describe our data and present the summary 
statistics. Our empirical methodology is outlined in the fourth section and the results from the 
empirical analysis are discussed. Finally, conclusions are presented. 
 
Related Literature 
 
Whilst it is possible to identify the influences of ethical and moral concerns in finance, 
investment and business throughout history, such concerns have become increasingly salient 
since the 1960s.  In particular, a plethora of acronyms such as ESG (Environmental, Social and 
Governance), CSR and SRI (Socially Responsible Investment2) have become increasingly 
mainstream in the last two decades. Despite the multi-faceted and contested nature of these 
labels, there is some ground common.  At their core is the incorporation of non-financial issues 
in investment and business decision-making.  In response to demand from market participants, 
metrics have emerged that illustrate how corporate social performance (CSP) is benchmarked.  
Although by no means providing perfect measures of CSP, the emergence of such metrics has 
facilitated a substantial body of research on the causes and effects of variations in CSP. 
  
                                                 
2Illustrating the growing importance placed upon environmental issues, SRI is now often used as an acronym for 
Sustainable and Responsible Investment. 
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Understanding the rationale for firms to allocate resources to CSR is clearly a relevant issue in 
terms of the expected effect on financial performance.  Indeed, since it involves costs to firms, 
there has long been debate about whether firms should be allocating any resources towards CSR.   
Implying that resources allocated to CSR constitute a deadweight loss and a negative relationship 
between CSP and corporate financial performance (CFP), Milton Friedman notoriously stated 
that “the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits”. The counter-argument has 
been that narrow neo-classical theories of the firm neglect the contribution of human and social 
capital to corporate financial performance. The contention is that CSR activities can improve 
firms‟ competitiveness by increasing demand from socially responsible consumers and by 
generating image and reputational benefits.  The latter can, in turn, produce additional 
advantages linked to reductions in regulatory risk and lower costs from campaigns by social and 
environmental activists and non-governmental organizations (see Bagnoli and Watts, 2003, 
Maxwell et al, 2000).   
 
In a useful taxonomy,  Bansal and Roth (2000) proposed three types of motive profiles that can 
individually or together stimulate a higher level of CSR commitment - the caring profile, the 
competitive profile and the concerned profile. In the caring profile, it is the organizational 
leadership that is the key driver of a firm‟s CSR commitment.  This can be characterized as a 
championing effort where improving the financial performance of the firm is not a primary 
objective.  In the competitive profile, a firm is motivated by business advantage.  Depending on 
the extent or existence of advantages, competitors may respond if improved CSR performance is 
perceived to create a competitive threat.   Finally, the concerned profile is characterized in terms 
of a pre-emptive, collective response by a group of market participants in an industry that 
introduces improvements in CSR performance in order to obtain reputational and regulatory 
benefits.  Both the competitive and concerned profiles imply that the primary aim of CSR 
activities is to improve CFP.  Clearly, in reality there are likely to be mixed motives.  
Nevertheless, improvements in financial performance can be directly linked to rationales for 
allocating resources to CSR activities. 
 
In terms of a priori expectations, CSR has been analyzed through a number of theoretical lenses 
which generate contrasting expected relationships between CSP and CFP.  For instance, 
instrumental stakeholder theory stresses the contribution of relationships with key stakeholders 
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(other than shareholders) such as employees, suppliers, customers and the local community to 
financial performance. Closely related stakeholder–agency theory emphasizes how CSR 
activities can reduce the agency costs within corporate structures by improving interest 
alignment and monitoring of the actions of employers, managers and employees.  Similarly, 
firm-as-contract theory also highlights the significance of, often implied, contracts with 
stakeholders as drivers of firms‟ financial performance.  Hence, the expected causal relationship 
is that CSP should determine CFP.  In contrast, slack resources theory implies the opposite 
relationship – that CFP determines CSP.  It proposes that surpluses generated by prior financial 
performance release resources for CSR activities. Whilst theories are often presented as mutually 
exclusive, it is possible that, similar to issue of motivation, the relative importance of resource 
availability and the salience of relationships with stakeholders may vary between sectors or firms 
and/or over time. 
 
There is a voluminous empirical literature examining whether CSP predicts CFP.  Not 
surprisingly, it has produced an assortment of findings (for reviews see Margolis, Elfenbein and 
Walsh, 2007; van Beurden and Goessling, 2008; Horvathova, 2010).  While a detailed review of 
this literature is outside the scope of this paper, it is clear that the topic is fraught with problems 
due to potential publication bias, differences in sampling periods and contested statistical 
procedures. Ruf et al (2001) propose that causes of the identified lack of consistency in empirical 
studies include weak theoretical foundations, inadequate and inconsistent measurement of CSP 
and CFP, weak methodology and sampling problems.  
  
However, recent reviews suggest that the balance of the evidence is supportive of a positive 
relationship between CSR performance and financial performance. Van Beurden and Goessling 
(2008) suggest that earlier reviews included too many papers from the period 1970-90 when the 
issue of CSR had low socio-political prominence.  Their review of studies from 1990 onwards 
concluded that the vast majority of studies had found a positive relationship between CSR 
performance and financial performance.  Hence, Vogel (2005, 19) asserts that “Were Friedman 
now to revisit this subject, he would find much less to concern him”.  Studies of the relationship 
between CSP and CFP have identified economic sector as a significant variable (see Chand, 
2006).  It has been suggested that, since different industries have different exposure to social, 
environmental and governance issues, studies encompassing many sectors can conceal sector-
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specific effects (Griffin and Mahon, 1997). Indeed, Chand (2006) suggests that research on the 
link between CSR performance and financial performance should focus on a single industry.  
 
Within the real estate literature, empirical estimation of the relationship between CSP and CFP 
has received little attention.  There is a body of essentially descriptive and/or qualitative work 
that has largely focussed on the investigating the increasing importance of SRI and CSR issues 
for real estate investors (for examples, see Newell, 2008 and 2009; Rapson, Shiers, Roberts and 
Keeping, 2007).  Focussing largely on governance per se, there is a body of work looking at US 
REITS on the relationship between governance ratings and other agency costs with financial 
performance (for examples, see Bauer, Eichholtz and Kok, 2010; Bianco, Ghosh and Sirmans, 
2007; Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu, 2008).  The results have been mixed.  Hartzell et al (2008) find 
that firms with stronger governance structures have higher initial IPO valuations and have better 
long-term operating performance than their peers.  In contrast, Bauer et al (2010) find that their 
index of governance strength is not related to REITs‟ Tobin‟s Q nor to Return on Assets, Return 
on Equity and Funds from Operation.  They suggest that, since the result contrasts with previous 
findings from studies of wider corporate performance, due to requirement to distribute at least 
90% of operational earnings there are reduced agency costs for REITs and governance is, 
consequently a less important factor.       
 
In terms of a theoretical framework, it is clear that a substantial proportion of empirical studies in 
CSR literature have found a positive relationship between CSP and CFP with varied degree of 
significance and strength. However, as mentioned previously and suggested by Surroca, Tribó 
and Waddock (2010), the empirical findings of a positive relationship between corporate social 
and financial performance may be spurious due to failure to identify  the mediating effects of 
intangible resources.  Surroca, Tribó and Waddock (2010) attempt to explore the missing link 
through which the effect (if any) may be transmitted. Their results indicate that there may be an 
indirect relationship that relies on the mediating effect of a firm‟s intangible resources.  
 
Complementary to Surroca, Tribó and Waddock (2010) model, our hypothesis is that there could 
be two effects from a strong CSP – a direct effect and an indirect effect. When a firm adopts an 
active CSR strategy, it is expected to bolster the risk profile of the organization. If the market is 
efficient, the CAPM framework suggests that a decrease in risk should lead to lower return. This 
6 
 
is the direct effect, asserting a negative feedback on the firm‟s return through risk mitigation. 
However, as documented in the CSR literature, the benefits of a strong CSP can include: better 
access to socially responsible investment flows, lower cost of debt, human resource advantages 
and positive effects on the brand of the firm.  These are the indirect effects which get transmitted 
through the intangible resources of the firm (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Direct and Indirect Effects of Active CSR Strategy 
 
 
 
Further, given the conflicting expectations generated by different theoretical perspectives, an 
empirical analysis of the (dynamic) relationship between CSP and CFP requires some 
consideration of a number of potential causality issues.  We need to be able to be clear that any 
significant positive or negative relationship identified is an effect of CSP on CFP.  For instance, 
if there is a positive contemporaneous association between the two, it could be due to superior 
CSP causing improved CFP. Alternatively, superior CFP could be causing improved CSP. 
Another possibility is that an exogenous variable may be jointly determining improvements in 
CSP and CFP.  A further potential complication is that elements of all these relationships may 
create intricate feedback and cascade effects.       
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Data and Summary Statistics 
 
Similar to credit rating agencies, social and environmental rating agencies ostensibly aim to 
provide independent measures of corporations‟ CSR performance, increase transparency and 
reduce the search costs associated with socially responsible investment strategies.  Ratings may 
be based on firms‟ past performance and/or they can also incorporate a firm‟s future potential 
relative position by evaluating their plans to improve future CSR performance (see Chatterji, 
Levine and Toffel, 2009).  It should be acknowledged that the quality of CSR ratings have been 
subject to some criticisms concerning their own lack of transparency and have been subject to 
little robust evaluation themselves (see Chatterji et al, 2009).  Hawken‟s (2004) scathing report 
on the SRI mutual fund sector highlighted the arbitrariness and inconsistencies in criteria used to 
assess firms‟ suitability for inclusion in responsibly invested portfolios.  Porter and Kramer 
(2006, 91) claimed “a confusion of CSR checklists.”    
 
As stated above, this study draws upon the KLD database.  KLD‟s social and environmental 
ratings are one of the most long established and have been widely used by academic researchers.  
Created by Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini and Co., the KLD index uses a proprietary system to 
assess companies on seven aspects of their CSR performance. They are community relations, 
corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights and products..  
Various scales are used to assess the performance in terms of major strength, minor strength, 
major weakness etc.  The number of indicators has varied from year to year with an upward 
trend.  The index is constructed from a combination of publicly available sources, other data 
organizations, direct communication with companies themselves and government information.  
Typically, the annual data is available 1-2 months after the end of the calendar year. 
 
We combine the information on sets of strength and concerns in the following index formula. 
 
 
 
 
In the above formulation, a score of 50 implies a neutral position, relative to strength and 
concerns; a score greater than 50 implies more „strengths‟ than „concerns‟. The further the score 
2100100100
concernsofnumber
concernsofsum
strengthsofnumber
strengthsofsum
IndexKLD
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is from 50 (towards 100), the stronger is the relative „strength‟; a score less than 50 implies more 
„concerns‟ than „strengths‟ and farther the score is from 50 (towards 0), the stronger is the 
relative „concerns‟. This index formulation combines the number of strengths and concerns on a 
continuous scale and facilitates comparison across companies.  
 
The source of our firm financial data is Datastream. As defined by Datastream, the real estate 
sector includes real estate services (brokers and real estate agents), development companies, 
investment companies and REITs, but excludes pure construction companies.In order to estimate 
our panel regression we include only complete cross sections in order to avoid attrition bias and 
as a result, our sample consists of mainly REITs (63.8%) but also includes a number of 
companies with substantial real estate holdings.  This diversity of the companies in the real estate 
sector also needs to be acknowledged. Although all firms are exposed to the real estate sector, 
there are significant differences between their core business models with many involved in 
financial services, construction, agriculture, inter alia. In order to control for sector differences, 
we also include SIC code dummies to control for sector effects in the econometric modeling3.   
 
Table 1 explains the variable definitions and the specific hypotheses. Table 2a provides 
descriptive statistics and Table 2b the correlation matrix for the variables used in the econometric 
models.  The time series encompasses the period 2003-2009.  
 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 
 
The relative index for the listed real estate companies at 48.87 is close to 50 and is also similar to 
the mean score for all companies in the KLD index for the sample period (49.23).  Whilst there 
can be a wide range of scores it is clear that most of the companies tend to be „bunched‟ around 
50.  In 2009, 26 of the 67 REITs had a score of 50. In 2009, the highest scoring REIT was RAIT 
Investment Trust which achieved a score of 53.75. Prima facie, its very poor (relative and 
absolute) performance in 2009 does not suggest a strong positive effect of its CSR performance 
in this particular case.  The comparable figures for the best performing companies in the KLD 
index was for Intel at 67.5. The worst REIT performers were Camden Property Trust and 
Colonial Properties Trust who both obtained a score of 46.25.  Despite their CSR score, both 
                                                 
3 SIC codes obtained from Datastream, code: [WC07021:WC07028]. 
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achieved extremely healthy returns in that year.  For all firms in the KLD index, the lowest score 
in 2009 was 35 obtained by KBR Inc – a large military construction and engineering contractor 
which is a former subsidiary of Halliburton.  
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Empirical Framework  
 
We apply a number of standard panel models.  First, we test the influence of CSR rating on firm 
value by regressing Tobin‟s Q (measured at time t) on the lagged CSR score (measured at t, t-1 
and t-2).   We calculate Tobin‟s Q following Han (2006) and specify the OLS model as: 
 
         (1) 
 
where qijt is the Tobin‟s Q for the firm i in sector j in year t. Kijt is the KLD index for the firm i in 
sector j in year t. Xijt is the vector of financial attributes of firm i in sector j in year t.  
 
The fixed effects model is: 
 
 
 
where qijt is the Tobin‟s Q for the firm i in sector j in year t. Kijt is the KLD index for the firm i in 
sector j in year t. Xijt is the vector of financial attributes of firm i in sector j in year t. i denotes a 
firm-specific fixed effect, ωj is the sector-specific fixed effect and t  is the year-specific fixed 
effect.  
 
Equations (1) and (2) have been estimated for time period 2003-2009 with 105 cross section 
observations. We estimate the above equations including the dummies for fixed effects for time 
and sectors and also as a mean-differenced model.   
 
One important issue that may affect our results is the possibility of measurement error in KLD 
Indices. This could arise due to multitude of reasons – reporting errors, frequent revisions as the 
revised figures and facts appear in next period company statements etc. Moreover, since CSR 
policies and actions complement long-term corporate strategy, it may as well take several years 
to reflect statistically significant effects of such CSR measures. To address these issues, we take 
time-invariant variables to model the CFP.  Specifically, variables are taken as averages over all 
years (2003-2009) and the structure is employed as follows:     
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                        (3) 
 
The way we have calculated the KLD index allows us to categorize between firms with positive 
and negative score. It is quite reasonable to expect that firm behavior may depend on the scale of 
the score. A firm with a positive score may have different motivation for CSP than those from a 
firm with a negative score. In terms of econometrics, this entails non-linear effects of KLD 
variable. To address this issue, we take a piece-wise regression approach (or, spline regression 
with the „knot‟ placed at the minimum of the residual standard error4) in equation (4a) below and 
alternatively, add non-linear terms to our estimation equation (4b) as follows. 
 
 
             (4a) 
 
               (4b) 
 
In order to test our hypothesis that higher levels of CSR strengths in all areas lead in the long run 
to a higher firm valuation, we expect β1 and β2 in Equation 4a to be positive and significant. 
Furthermore, we expect simultaneously β1 to be negative and β2 positive in equation 4b in order 
to obtain an increasing non-linear effect on Tobin‟s Q. 
                                                 
4 The specification of the break point is explained in APPENDIX 2. 
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Results and Analysis  
 
We employ our estimation strategy with two dependent variables – Tobin‟s Q and Total Return. 
Table 3 presents the estimation with Tobin‟s Q as dependent variable within the framework of 
equations 1 and 2. We take a baseline model and add lagged terms and assume various fixed 
effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity specific to the company, sector and time period. 
This gradual development of the econometric assumptions shows the robustness and stability of 
the results. Column 1 presents our baseline model with only contemporaneous variables. 
Columns 2 and 3 add 1-period and 2-period lagged KLD variable respectively. Since we find, as 
theorized, a significant positive effect at 2-period lag, we take this model forward and assume 
sector-specific fixed effect (column 4), sector and time fixed effects (column 5), company and 
time fixed effects (column 6) and separate controls for strengths and concerns with sector as well 
as time fixed effects in column 7. We also test for joint significance of the KLD variables. The 
adjusted r-squared values are quite reasonable and reflect goodness of fit. We find that a 
significant positive effect of the two period lagged index enhances Tobin´s Q.  This is consistent 
with the expectation that improved CSR performance produces a subsequent improvement in 
financial performance. It is consistent with stakeholder theories of CSR effects rather than slack 
resources arguments. When fixed sector and time effects are added to the model, the results 
remain robust.  Coefficients and explanatory power tend to remain very similar across the 
specifications. The test for joint significance of the KLD index including the lag structure 
supports our inference at 5% level for concerns but is insignificant for strengths .    
 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 here 
 
Table 4 contains the same set of estimation results as in Table 3 with Total Return as the 
dependent variable and adding NAREIT return as an additional control. The first three columns 
present OLS results without any explicit assumptions for unobserved heterogeneity and columns 
4 through 7 present models with various fixed effects. We also test for joint significance of the 
KLD variables. The adjusted r-squared values are quite reasonable except for company and time 
fixed effects.  We find that no consistent result.  However, there is some evidence of negative 
association between CSR performance and total return.  Most of the individual coefficients on 
the KLD index score are negative and are jointly significant in a number of the model 
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specifications.  However, when fixed sector and time effects are added to the model, the results 
do not remain robust.  For total return, „concerns‟ have no statistically significant effect on 
returns.  In contrast, the evidence shows that the finding of a negative association is generated by 
„strength‟. However, the coefficients are not consistent.  There is a significant positive 
association between KLD strengths and total return with a one year lag for real estate companies.  
In contrast, the coefficients for a contemporaneous KLD strengths and KLD strengths lagged two 
years are significantly negative at the 1% level.  There is no evidence to support an association 
between KLD concern scores and total returns. 
 
Table 5 is estimated within the framework of Equation 3. In these estimations, we are concerned 
about presence errors-in-variables and long-run realization of effects from an active CSR 
strategy. As before, we initially estimate the equation with and without any explicit assumptions 
of unobserved heterogeneity. The adjusted r-squared values reflect quite reasonable explanatory 
power of the model specifications.  The lack of any significant association between KLD score 
and Tobin‟s Q or total return in the time invariant model is consistent with the interpretation that 
there is a lagging relationship between changes in CSP performance and financial performance.  
 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 here 
 
Table 6 presents the empirical approach outlined in Equations 4a and 4b. In these results, we are 
concerned with the possibility of non-linearity in impact of the CSP on Tobin´s Q. Specifically, 
we hypothesize that the effects may depend on the scale of the CSP. A firm with a positive score 
may have different motivation and impact of CSP than those from a firm with a negative score. 
In terms of the econometrics, this calls for incorporating non-linear terms of KLD variable.. We 
add quadratic terms in Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8. Note that we run these models with and without 
fixed effects. The adjusted r-squared values are reasonable and our empirical results show 
evidence of a non-linear relationship between CSR and Tobin´s Q. Both piece-wise CSR 
variables show positive significant values without taking time and company fixed effects into 
account. The coefficient of the second piece-wise variable is higher than the “normal” CSR level 
indicating that higher levels of responsibility create more additional firm value. The same effect 
is generated by analyzing the coefficients of the level CSR and quadratic CSR-Variable. The 
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sign and statistical significance show a increasing U-shaped effect of CSR to firm value. 
Nevertheless, the latter holds only for sector fixed effects.  
Table 7 shows the empirical non-linear approach with total return as dependent variable. In this 
case the statistical significance of the piece-wise variables is not given. Nevertheless, columns 2, 
6 and 7 show the U-shaped relationship of CSR to financial performance. Following the latter, 
only higher levels of responsibility are able to enhance significantly the financial performance. 
The results hold for all fixed effects specifications except for sector effects. Table 7 corroborates 
the hypothesis that higher levels of (present) responsibility enhance financial performance and 
explain (perhaps) the unusual result of our linear approach in Table 4. Furthermore, our control 
variables are constant for all fixed effects specifications which prove the stability of our model.  
 
Conclusion  
 
With growing interest in sustainability issues, the real estate sector has been engaging 
increasingly with Corporate Social Responsibility objectives.  There has been a longstanding and 
substantial body of work on the relationship between CSP and CFP in non-real estate industries.  
To our knowledge, this paper provides the first empirical evidence on this issue within the real 
estate sector.  We draw upon the methodological frameworks and the databases used in 
investigating these issues in non-real estate studies in our analysis.  Our results are largely 
consistent with the existing literature finding a positive relationship between CFP and CSP.    
 
Overall, we find that the impact of CSP on CFP works through two channels – indirect and direct 
effects. In general, our prior expectation of a significant link between CSP and CFP is confirmed 
by the empirical analysis presented in this paper but the impact differs for the direct and indirect 
effect. For the indirect link we find a positive association between lagged KLD score and 
contemporaneous Tobin‟s Q while we find a negative relationship between lagged KLD score 
and total return.  
 
However, further work is required to draw more robust inferences.  In particular, it may be 
important to control for differences within the REIT sector itself.  To this end, we intend to 
augment our existing database on financial and ESG performance with information about the 
asset holdings of the REITs.  In particular, it should be possible to add information on REITs‟ 
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exposure to eco-labeled buildings and investigate the three-way relationship between investment 
in LEED and Energy labeled assets, corporate financial performance and corporate social 
performance.  The relationship between CSR rating and risk-adjusted returns will also be a 
useful addition to our modeling framework.  
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Table 1: Variable Description & Expected Effects 
Variable Source  Expected effect TQ Return 
TobinsQ 
Long term firm value measured as market capitalization 
plus debt (long and short) term debt and preferred stock 
divided by total assets. 
Datastream / / 
Stock Return Logarithm of the Return Index Datastream / / 
Volatility Stock return volatility calculated with weekly returns for the present year. Datastream / / 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on assets for each year defined by DS as: Net 
income before preferred dividends+((interest expense on 
debt-interest capitalized)*(1-Tax rate)))/Average of last 
year´s and current year´s total assets*100. 
Datastream + + 
Total Assets 
Sum of total assets for each year defined by DS as: sum of 
total current assets, long term receivables, investments in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property 
plant and equipment and other assets. 
Datastream +/- +/- 
NAREIT 
Return Total yearly return of the NAREIT index NAREIT / + 
DowJones 
Return 
Total yearly return of the Dow Jones Composite 65 Stock 
Average  index Dow Jones - - 
Growth in 
GDP Growth on US gross Domestic product BEA +/- +/- 
Leverage Ratio, calculated as short term debt and current proportion of long term debt divided by total assets Datastream 
 
- - 
KLD 
Performance Environmental, social and governance performance index. 
KLD-
Database + + 
KLD 
Strengths Total score of strengths in all areas for the firm in year t. 
KLD-
Database + + 
KLD 
Concerns Total score of concerns in all areas for the firm in year t. 
KLD-
Database - - 
KLD piece-
wise 
Piece-wise transformation of KLD-index in order to 
estimate non-linear effects. See Appendix 2. 
KLD-
Database + + 
Net Sales Represent gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances Datastream + + 
Operating 
Income 
Represents the difference between sales and total operating 
expenses Datastream + + 
Market 
Capitalization 
Calculated as Market Price-Year End * Common Shares 
Outstanding Datastream +/- +/- 
Common 
Equity 
Represents common shareholders' investment in a 
company. Datastream +/- +/- 
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Table 2a: Summary Statistics  
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
Tobin‟s Q 
 735 1.309 0.7685 0.051 6.004 
Total Return (%) 
 735 0.063 0.421 -2.327 1.001 
KLD Index 
 735 48.868 3.235 35.714 64.238 
KLD Index_Strength 735 3.082 5.540 0 42.553 
KLD Index_Concern 735 5.346 5.270 0 28.571 
Return on Assets (%) 735 5.416 6.120 -27.330 37.920 
Leverage (%) 735 6.100 13.780 0 82.760 
Total Assets ($mil.) 735 6`180`892.2 16`063`704.9 95`424.8 245`133`000.0 
Common Equity ($mil.) 735 1`475`174.6 2`101`800.9 4`144.9 25`093`780.0 
Market Cap ($mil.) 735 3`370`918.6 4`409`203.0 42`773.0 44`356`234.8 
NAREIT Return (%) 7 0.078 0.279 -0.467 0.326 
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Table 2b: Correlation Matrix 
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Total Assets 1.000           
Common Equity 0.825 1.000          
Return on Assets -0.086 -0.060 1.000         
Market Cap 0.649 0.784 0.086 1.000        
Total Return 0.022 0.021 0.259 0.145 1.000       
NAREIT Return -0.030 -0.044 0.184 0.032 0.705 1.000      
Tobin‟s Q -0.214 -0.176 0.493 0.037 0.237 0.161 1.000     
Leverage 0.174 0.059 -0.109 -0.003 -0.049 -0.005 -0.309 1.000    
KLD Index 0.073 0.037 0.045 0.056 0.003 0.029 -0.073 0.164 1.000   
KLD Index_Strength 0.293 0.249 0.024 0.353 -0.064 -0.054 -0.039 0.059 0.625 1.000  
KLD Index_Concern 0.219 0.217 -0.030 0.303 -0.070 -0.093 0.048 -0.139 -0.571 0.284 1.000 
21 
 
Table 3: Panel Regression Models  
(Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
KLD Index (t) 0.029 
(3.724)*** 
0.007 
(0.735) 
0.009 
(0.768) 
0.005 
(0.396) 
-0.019 
(-1.656)* 
-0.017 
(-1.451) 
 
KLD Index (t-1)  
 
0.022 
(2.346)* 
-0.0149 
(-2.090)* 
-0.007 
(-0.538) 
-0.010 
(-1.364) 
-0.013 
(-2.122)** 
 
KLD Index (t-2)  
 
 0.037 
(2.863)** 
0.031 
(3.059)*** 
0.024 
(1.835)* 
0.025 
(1.880)* 
 
KLD Index_Strength (t)  
 
     -0.005 
(-0.621) 
KLD Index_Strength (t-1)  
 
     -0.011 
(-1.673)* 
KLD Index_Strength (t-2)  
 
     0.015 
(1.428) 
KLD Index_Concern (t)  
 
     0.013 
(2.129)** 
KLD Index_Concern (t-1)       -0.000 
(-0.061) 
KLD Index_Concern (t-2)       -0.009 
(-1.215) 
Return on Assets (%) 0.014 
(1.066) 
0.0118 
(1.011) 
0.010 
(0.920) 
0.014 
(3.969)*** 
0.013 
(1.307) 
0.012 
(1.163) 
0.013 
(1.322) 
Leverage  -0.023 
(-0.089) 
-0.003 
(-0.010) 
-0.109 
(-0.465) 
-0.196 
(-1.201) 
-0.182 
(-0.718) 
0.025 
(0.098) 
-0.183 
(-0.729) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.518 
(-4.643)*** 
-0.506 
(-5.043)*** 
-0.470 
(-5.070)*** 
-0.419 
(-11.98)*** 
-0.502 
(-5.189)*** 
-0.494 
(-5.558)*** 
-0.505 
(-5.467)*** 
Log(Common Equity) -0.197 
(-3.973)*** 
-0.166 
(-3.274)** 
-0.172 
(-3.352)*** 
-0.178 
(-4.539)*** 
-0.137 
(-3.569)*** 
-0.200 
(-3.919)*** 
-0.134 
(-3.705)*** 
Log(Market Cap) 0.706 
(6.194)*** 
0.668 
(6.790)*** 
0.629 
(7.001)*** 
0.573 
(19.14)*** 
0.549 
(7.151)*** 
0.590 
(7.186)*** 
0.546 
(6.644)*** 
Fixed Effects? None None None Sector FE Sector and 
Time FE 
Company and 
Time FE 
Sector and 
Time FE 
Joint Significance p-value 
(KLD variables) 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.039** 0.043** 0.145 (str.) 
0.146 (con.) 
Adj. R2 61,67 61.84 61.51 65.61 68.15 62.22 67.81 
N 735 630 525 525 525 525 525 
NOTES:  T-statistics (with robust standard errors following Arellano [1987] due to N>T) are reported within the parentheses. „***‟, „**‟, and „*‟ denote 
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
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 Table 4: Panel Regression Models  
(Dependent variable: Total Return) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
KLD Index (t) -0.005 
(-2.278)** 
-0.009 
(-1.374) 
-0.005 
(-0.550) 
-0.006 
(-0.703) 
-0.007 
( -0.701) 
-0.001 
(-0.162) 
 
KLD Index (t-1)  
 
0.003 
(0.609) 
0.012 
(1.146) 
0.010 
(0.967) 
0.012 
( 1.130) 
0.013 
(1.214) 
 
KLD Index (t-2)  
 
 -0.015 
(-2.030)** 
-0.011 
(-1.523) 
-0.010 
( -1.397) 
-0.011 
(-1.499) 
 
KLD Index_Strength (t)  
 
     -0.014 
( -2.447)** 
KLD Index_Strength (t-1)  
 
     0.020 
( 2.997)*** 
KLD Index_Strength (t-2)  
 
     -0.012 
( -2.871)*** 
KLD Index_Concern (t)  
 
     -0.006 
( -1.019) 
KLD Index_Concern (t-1)       0.004 
( 0.492) 
KLD Index_Concern (t-2)       -0.002 
( 0.694) 
Return on Assets (%) -0.001 
(-0.362) 
0.002 
(-0.851) 
-0.002 
(-0.636) 
-0.007 
(-2.607)*** 
-0.005 
( -1.815)* 
-0.001 
(-0.225) 
-0.050 
( -1.974)** 
Leverage  0.237 
(2.256)** 
0.326 
(3.615)*** 
0.406 
(4.356)*** 
0.452 
(5.246)*** 
0.474 
( 5.295)*** 
0.407 
(3.954)*** 
0.469 
( 5.351)*** 
Log(Total Assets) -0.096 
(-3.371)*** 
-0.110 
(-3.691)*** 
-0.111 
(-3.468)*** 
-0.158 
(-5.034)*** 
-0.151 
( -4.081)*** 
-0.108 
(-3.268)*** 
-0.141 
( -3.741)*** 
Log(Common Equity) -0.074 
(-2.584)*** 
-0.078 
(-2.481)** 
-0.082 
(-2.082)** 
-0.049 
(-1.184) 
-0.073 
( -1.561) 
-0.096 
(-2.282)** 
-0.087 
( -1.784)* 
Log(Market Cap) 0.185 
(6.605)*** 
0.205 
(7.181)*** 
0.213 
(6.961)*** 
0.240 
(9.368)*** 
0.262 
( 9.184)*** 
0.245 
(7.469)** 
0.275 
( 8.911)*** 
NAREIT Return (%) 0.950 
(20.782)*** 
0.916 
(16.417)*** 
0.908 
(15.274)*** 
0.900 
(15.170)*** 
-2.664 
( -0.640) 
NA -6.573 
( -2.542)** 
Fixed Effects? None None None Sector FE Sector and 
Time FE 
Company and 
Time FE 
Sector and 
Time FE 
Joint Significance p-value 
(KLD variables) 
0.014** 0.034* 0.041** 0.153 0.453 0.381 0.006*** (str.) 
0.560 (con.) 
Adj. R2 58.54 56.56 54.95 56.81 57.46 22.70 58.09 
N 735 630 525 525 525 525 525 
NOTES:  T-statistics (with robust standard errors following Arellano [1987] due to N>T) are reported within the parentheses. „***‟, „**‟, and „*‟ 
denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. NAREIT Return in column 6 not available due to time fixed effects. 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Time-Invariant Regression Models  
(Dependent variables: Tobin’s Q and Total Return)  
 (1) 
TQ 
(2) 
TQ 
(3) 
TR 
(4) 
TR 
(5) 
TQ 
(6) 
TR 
(7) 
TQ 
(8) 
TR 
KLD Index 0.012 (0.806)  
0.000 
(0.030)    
0.013 
(0.800) 
-0.002 
(-0.476) 
KLD Index_Strength   
0.004 
(0.488)  
-0.001 
(-0.422) 
0.004 
(0.364) 
-0.002 
(-0.791)   
KLD Index_Concern    
-0.009 
(-1.084)  
-0.001 
(-0.664) 
-0.010 
(-0.956) 
-0.000 
(0.920)   
Return on Assets (%) 0.026 (0.943) 
0.027 
(0.942) 
0.002 
(0.409) 
0.002 
(0.438) 
0.030 
(1.286) 
-0.002 
(-0-418) 
0.029 
(1.297) 
-0.002 
(-0.501) 
Leverage  0.424 (1.199) 
0.410 
(1.129) 
0.069 
(0.729) 
0.062 
(0.661) 
0.304 
(0.893) 
0.165* 
(1.913) 
0.311 
(0.909) 
0.167 
(1.925)* 
Log(Total Assets) -0.612 (-4.079)*** 
-0.606 
(-3.915)*** 
-0.042 
(-1.591) 
-0.040 
(-1.489) 
-0.635 
(-4.353)*** 
-0.065* 
(-1.897) 
-0645 
(-4.392)*** 
-0.069 
(-1.955)* 
Log(Common Equity) -0.246 (-3.074)*** 
-0.252 
(-3.075)*** 
-0.040 
(-1.979)* 
-0.043 
(-2.111)** 
-0.154 
(-2.364)** 
-0.038 
(-1.706)** 
-0.143 
(-2.149)** 
-0.034 
(-1.546) 
Log(Market Cap) 0.809 (5.462)*** 
0.816 
(5.547)*** 
0.099 
(3.476)*** 
0.102 
(3.624)*** 
0.756 
(5.796)*** 
0.121 
(3.795)*** 
0.748 
(5.976)*** 
0.118 
(3.760)*** 
Fixed Effects? None None None None Sector FE Sector FE Sector FE Sector FE 
Joint Significance p-value 
(KLD variables)  0.547  0.682 0.473 0.690   
Adj. R2 72.80 72.58 20.40 20.22 78.45 23.11 78.61 23.6 
N 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
NOTES:  T-statistics (with robust standard errors following Arellano [1987] due to N>T) are reported within the parentheses. „***‟, „**‟, and „*‟ denote 
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
24 
 
    
Table 6: Piece-Wise Panel Regression Models  
(Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q) 
Non-linear effects calculated for KLD-Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
KLD Piecewise 1 0.058 (3.673)***  
0.048 
(3.804)***  
0.005 
(0.321)  
0.008 
(0.457)  
KLD Piecewise 2 0.071 (3.590)***  
0.0575 
(3.979)***  
0.0105 
(0.562)  
0.015 
(0.735)  
KLD Index  0.170 (3.614)**  
0.165 
(4.149)***  
-0.207 
(-0.997)  
-0.203 
(-1.065) 
KLD Index²  -0.002 (-3.057)***  
-0.002 
(-3.358)***  
0.002 
(0.923)  
0.002 
(0.976) 
Return on Assets (%) 0.051 (3.555)*** 
0.050 
(3.607)*** 
0.053 
(4.005)*** 
0.0515 
(4.242)*** 
0.048 
(3.640)*** 
0.048 
(3.590)*** 
0.048 
(3.174)*** 
0.047 
(3.096)*** 
Leverage  -0.911 (-4.248)*** 
-0.757 
(-3.188)*** 
-0.769 
(-3.298)*** 
-0.769 
(-3.095)*** 
-0.723 
(-2.920)*** 
-0.724 
(-2.877)*** 
-0.706 
(-3.072)*** 
-0.703 
(-2.975)*** 
Log(Total Assets) -0.284 (-2.486)** 
-0.322 
(-2.818)*** 
-0.260 
(-2.597)*** 
-0.326 
(-2.997)*** 
-0.351 
(-3.222)*** 
-0.351 
(3.206)*** 
-0.340 
(-3.038)*** 
-0.340 
(-2.990)*** 
Log(Common Equity) 0.173 (1.857)* 
0.139 
(1.710)* 
0.140 
(1.528) 
0.154 
(1.671)* 
0.165 
(1.783)* 
0.164 
(1.766)* 
0.140 
(1.764)* 
0.159 
(1.737)* 
Fixed Effects? None None Sector FE Sector FE Sector and Time FE 
Sector and 
Time FE 
Company and 
Time FE 
Company and 
Time FE 
Joint Significance p-value 
(KLD variables) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.028*** 0.000*** 0.020** 
Adj. R2 39.35 40.80 48.92 49.82 51.94  53.25 40.44 39.52 
N 735 735 735 735 735 735 735 735 
NOTES:  T-statistics (with robust standard errors following Arellano [1987] due to N>T) are reported within the parentheses. „***‟, „**‟, and „*‟ denote 1%, 5% and 
10% significance levels respectively. 
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Table 7: Piece-Wise Panel Regression Models  
(Dependent variable: Total Return) 
Non-linear effects calculated for KLD-Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
KLD Piecewise 1 -0.008 (-3.342)***  
-0.008 
(-3.805)***  
-0.006 
(-1.788)  
-0.003 
(-0.893)  
KLD Piecewise 2 -0.010 (-3.622)***  
-0.009 
(-3.816)***  
-0.006 
(-1.537)  
-0.005 
(-1.085)  
KLD Index  -0.017 (-2.481)**  
0.014 
(-1.766)*  
0.080 
(2.167)**  
0.093 
(2.719)*** 
KLD Index²  0.0001 (1.922)*  
0.000 
(1.025)  
-0.001 
(-2.302)**  
-0.001 
(-2.736)*** 
Return on Assets (%) -0.000 (-0.090) 
-0.000 
(-0.067) 
-0.002 
(-0.850) 
-0.002 
(-0.848) 
-0.001 
(-0.579) 
-0.001 
(-0.582) 
0.001 
(0.101) 
0.000 
(0.127) 
Leverage  0.284 (3.487)*** 
0.273 
(3.070)*** 
0.336 
(4.576)*** 
0.329 
(4.150)*** 
0.348 
(4.210)*** 
0.351 
(4.287)*** 
0.289 
(3.265)*** 
0.289 
(3.246)*** 
Log(Total Assets) -0.131 (-5.140)*** 
-0.127 
(-4.740)*** 
-0.149 
(-6.184)*** 
-0.147 
(-5.705)*** 
-0.151 
(-5.640)*** 
-0.152 
(-5.675)*** 
-0.132 
(-4.878)*** 
-0.132 
(-4.823)*** 
Log(Market Cap) 0.162 (6.538)*** 
0.160 
(6.314)*** 
0.179 
(7.912)*** 
0.178 
(7.678)*** 
0.190 
(7.810)*** 
0.192 
(7.944)*** 
0.173 
(6.756)*** 
0.175 
(6.812)*** 
Return NAREIT 0.967 (19.040)*** 
0.600 
(19.120)*** 
0.959 
(18.599)*** 
0.954 
(18.742)*** 
0.304 
(0.360) 
-6.448 
(-2.182)** NA NA 
Fixed Effects? 
None None Sector FE Sector FE Sector and 
Time FE 
Sector and 
Time FE 
Company and 
Time FE 
Company and 
Time FE 
Joint Significance p-value 
(KLD variables) 
0.001*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.013** 0.389 0.160 0.300 0.1153 
Adj. R2 57.10 56.88 57.41 57.26 57.69 57.78 16.77 16.99 
N 735 735 735 735 735 735 735 735 
NOTES:  T-statistics (with robust standard errors following Arellano [1987] due to N>T) are reported within the parentheses. „***‟, „**‟, and „*‟ denote 1%, 5% and 
10% significance levels respectively. NAREIT Return in column 7 and 8 not available due to time fixed effects. 
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Appendix 2: Non-linear Analysis of the Relationship between Tobin’s Q and CSR Performance 
 
 
Note: The optimal break point for the piece-wise CSR-Variables is estimated as follows: Tobin‟s Q is regressed against each possible CSR 
score to estimate the residual standard error (RSE). Next, the break point is assigned at the minima of the RSE which is 46.20 in this case. 
The graphics show the effect of the CSR variable on Tobin‟s Q with and without non-linear effects.  
